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CLASSIFICATION OF VOTING GAMES ON MANIFOLDS* 
Norman Schofield 
ABSTRACT 
A voting game o is classified by two integers v*(o) ,w*(o) ,(v*(o) < w*(O)). 
In dimension < w*(o) the existence of the o-core is structurally stable 
(in the c
1
-topology on smooth profiles); in dimension > v*(o) the 
emptiness of the o-core is structurally stable. 
* Thanks are due to Gary Cox, of the University of Texas at Austin, for 
making available some of his unpublished work. The results presented 
here are much influenced by Cox's work. 
CLASSIFIC:'\TION OF VOTING GAMES ON MANIFOLDS* 
Norman Schofield 
Introduction 
The purpose of this note is to present a classification theorem for 
voting games. Any voting game,o, is essentially classified by two integers, 
v*(o) and w*(o), which we shall call the stability and instability dimensions. 
Suppose that W is a policy space of dimension w; by that we mean that W is 
either a smooth w-dimensional manifold (perhaps with boundary) or is a convex 
subset of a topological vector space. In the latter case the dimension of w 
is the dimension of the affine manifold generated by w. In either case we 
shall simply call W a w-manifold. Let N = {l, . .. ,i, • • .  ,n} be the society. 
The voting game a is characterised by a family..9 of subsets of N. Each member 
of iJ is called a winning coalition. 
Suppose now that u (u1, • • •  ,u . ,  • • •  ,u ) :W + 1R
n is a smooth profile for N i n 
on the w-manifold w. A standard object of study is the �· Say a point x is 
dominated by a point y, and write yo(u)x, if and only if there is a coalition 
M in .$ such that u .  (y) > u .  (x) for all i in M. A point x in W belongs to1 1 
the core, or global optima set, GO(o,u), of o(u) if and only if there is no 
point y in w such that yo(u)x. We shall also say that a point x in w belongs 
to the g� cycle set, GC(o,u), of o(u) if and only if there exists a finite 
subset {y1, • •
. 
,yr} in w such that 
xo(uly1 o(u) . . • •  o(u)yrx. 
Since preferences are, smooth it is possible to define two differential 
analogues of GO(o,u) and GC(o,u), which we shall call the critical (or 
infinitesimal) optima and cycle sets IO(o,u) and IC(o,u). Previous analyses 
(Schofield 1978,1980) have shown that GO(o,u) is a subset of IO(o,u) and 
IC(o,u) is a subset of GC(o,u). It has previously been shown (Walker,1977) 
that when w is compact, and GC(o,u) is empty, then GO(o,u) must be non empty. 
I 
Moreover if w is a manifold of a certain topological k�nd (for example 
contractible) then if IC(o,u) is empty, IO(o,u) must be non-empty (Schofield 
1983a). 
Finally, if all preferences are convex, then IO(o,u) and GO(o,u) 
coincide. Thus knowledge on the existence or otherwise of IC(o,u) and 
IO(o,u) provides information on the existence of a core of the voting game 
(o,u). 
The classification we propose is in terms of the existence of the sets 
IO(o,u) and IC(o,u) as u varies across all smooth profiles. 
First of all let u (W)N be the space of smooth profiles for N on W,endowed r 
with--the Whitney Cr-topology. In the case that W is a compact subset of
JRw this topology can be given an easy interpretation. A profile v belongs 
to a neighbourhood Nr(u,o) of a profile u if and only if, for all x<=:W
for all iE: N, and for all k = O, • . •  ,r, 
[ [ du�(x) - dv�(x) [ J < o. 
1 1 
Here dku. is the kth differential of u .  :W + JR (where we use the notation 
1 1 
that the zeroth differential du� = u . ). 1 1 
The Cr-topology can be defined when W is a smooth manifold, even for w not 
compact (see Hirsch 1976). 
Note that the Cr-topology is finer than the Cs-topology whenever r > s. That 
is to say that a set which is open in U (W)N must be open in s 
converse need not be true. In particular an open set in the 
( N 
. ( N u1 W) need not be open in U0 W) • 
u (W)N, but the r 
l C -topology 
2 
Suppose now that W is a w-manifold and o a voting game. Define the 
stable subspace of profiles to be 
Kl (O,W) 
N {uGUl (W) : IO(O,u) '/- <I> 
and IC(o,u) 
and the unstable subspace of profiles to be 
r/.1(o,W) 
N {ueu1 (W) :IO(cr,u) 
(Here <I> is the empty set in ») 
<I> and IC(o,u) 1' t} 
<1>} 
3 
Note that we use the c
1
-topology. For convenience in notatio;1 we shall simply 
write K for K1 and U(W)
N for u1(w)
N etc. 
Definition 
i) 
ii) 
The stable dimension v*(cr) is the smallest integer such that for 
any w-manifold,W, if w > v* (o) then J:.(o ,W) has non empty interior 
in U(W)N 
The unstable dimension w*(O) is the greatest integer such that, 
for any w-manifold,W, if w < w*(o) then K(o,W) has non empty 
interior in U(W)N. 
In the following sections of the paper we show that the stable and unstable 
dimensions do exist, and illustrate how they may be computed. By this method we 
obtain a classification theorem for all voting games in the case of smooth 
profiles. 
Consider the nature of the classification. From (ii) for example 
it must be possible to find a manifold W of dimension w*(o) such that, 
4 
if u is a profile with IO(o,u) 1' <I> then, in� neighbourhood V of u in U(W)N, 
there exists a profile v such that IO(o,v) = <I>. We shall also say that the 
property "IO(o,u) 1' <!>" is structurally unstable, since it is destroyed by 
arbitrary small perturbation. On the other hand if W is any manifold of 
I 
dimension w .::_ w*(o)-1 then it is possible to find a �rofile u and a 
neighbourhood v of u in U(W)N such that IO(o,v) 1' <I> for all v in V. Thus 
"IO (o, u) 1' <I>" is structurally stable 
The stability dimension 
We first of all give the definitions of the two critical sets 
IO( o,u) and IC(o,u), associated with a game o and profile u. 
For a coalition M, define the set IO(M,u) in W by xGIO(M,u) iff there 
exists no yGW such that for all ie M, dui (x) (y-x) > 
optima set of o(u) by IO(o,u) = n M..0 IO(M,u). 
Here iJ is the set of winning coalitions of o. 
At a point xGW, define p(x) = {Mc..8:x,G.IO(M,u) }. 
0. Define the critical 
For coalition M C-N, let pM(x) be the convex hull of {dui (x):i e 
M }. 
Define the directional core at x to be 
po(x) = n ( /?J (x) PM x) 
and define the critical cycle set of o(u) by 
IC(o,u) {xt::W:p (x) = <!>}. 
0 
As mentioned previously, it has been shown (Schofield,1978,1980) that 
GO(o,u) C IO(o,u) 
and IC(o,u) C GC(o,u). 
We now define the stability dimension v*(o). 
For any family/:) of subsets of N, let C (jj) = � be the collegium of J:J • 
If o is a voting game with winning coalitions j) such that C "6l i <I> then 
call o collegial and define v(o) = �. 
If c</)J =<I> then define the Nakamura (1978) number, v(o),of o to be 
v(o) min {l_.G•I :,P•cfJ and C(i�.I') =<I>}. 
For example suppose o is proper: if A, B belong to � then A n B i <I>. In 
this case if ,/J• = {A,B} then CW') i <I> and so v(o) > 3. 
A q-majority game, o , has winning coalitions ;fJ 
q q {MCN: IMI � q}. 
It is easy to show that for a q-game, when q < n, then 
v(o ) = v(n,q)+2, where v(n,q) is the greatest integer which is strictly q 
less than q/ n-q. 
Strict majority rule om is the q-game given by : 
(n,q) J (2k,k+l) 
l c2k+l ,k+l) 
if n is J even lodd 
In the case that (n,q) = (4,3) then v(n,q) = 2 and so v(o) 
For any other strict majority rule, om, v(om
) 3.
4. 
It has been shown (Schofield 1983b) that if W is a smooth manifold of 
dimension w _::. v(o)-2 then, for any smooth profile on W, the cycle set 
IC(o,u) must be empty. Moreover if W is a compact convex set in JRw, and 
w _::. v(o)-2 then the optima set must be non empty (Schofield 1983c). 
5 
Consequently it is possible to find a smooth manifold W of dimension v(o)-2 
N such that, for all u�U(W) , IC(o,u) =<I> and IO(o,u) i <I>. Thus 
�(o,W) is itself empty. 
This suggests that v(o)-2 is a candidate for the stability dimension v*(o). 
I 
Strnad (1981,1982) has shown that if W is a convex manifold of 
dimension v(o)-1 then it is possible to construct a smooth profile 
u on W such that IO(o,u) <I>. Adapting Strnad's method somewhat, 
Schofield (1983d) showed, for any smooth manifold W of dimension at 
least v(o)-1, that a smooth profile u on W could be constructed such that 
I 
IC(o,u) i <I> and IO(o,u) = <I>. Moreover this property was �tructurally 
stable, i.e. true for any profile in some neighbourhood of u in U(W)N. 
Finally note that if o is collegial, then by definition v(o) In 
Schofield (1983b) it was shown that if o was collegial, then for any 
ueU(W)N, IC(o,u) <I>. 
Thus we obtain: 
rheorem 1 For any voting game, o, it is the case that the stability 
iimension v*(o) equals v(o)-2. 
6 
)ne further minor point. At dimension v*(o)+l it is possible to show that when 
LC(o,u) is non empty then it must belong to the critical pareto set IO(N,ul. 
In dimension v*(o)+2 and above this is not the case. 
The instability dimension 
Suppose that for some voting game,o, it was the case that w*(o) _::. v*(o). 
As we have observed, in dimension v*(o) it is always the case that IC(o,u) =<I>. 
As a result it is possible to construct a profile u in this dimension such 
that the property "IO(o,u) i <I> " is structurally stable. Consequently 
it must be the case that v*(o) < w*(o). If o is a collegial game then 
w*(O) = � 
Suppose then that o is a non-collegial game with iJ its winning coalitions. 
For each subfamily /)' of £J such that C C:/J') 
w (Jl• l = max { J M J : M € ,f; • } , 
w(cr) = min { w r.J;• l :  £)• C � and c!t•) = it>}. 
ii> define 
For example in a q-game,cr (with q < n), it is possible to find a family q 
/;' of (q+l) distinct coalitions, each with q members, such that cc.i@'l = ii>. 
Thus w(cr ) < q. q -
For an arbitrary non-collegial game it certainly must be 
the case that w(cr) � n-L For a collegial voting game define \1(cr) = ... 
7 
Schofield (1980) showed that if cr was a non collegial voting game on a 
smooth w-manifold without boundary, and w � w(cr) then IO(cr,u) was almost 
always or generically empty. 
To be m:>re precise, a residual set R in U(W)
N 
is a dense set formed 
by the countable intersection of open dense sets in U(W)N. If W is compact 
then R will also be open. A generic property is one that is true for all 
profiles in a residual set. From standard results in singularity theory, 
the critical optima set for a coalition M in .9 is generically a geometric 
object of dimension at most J M J -1. In dimension w(cr), a counting argument 
shows that the critical optima sets of the winning coalitions generically do 
not intersect. 
Hence if W is a w-manifold without boundary, and if w � w(cr), then for 
all u in a dense set R(cr,W) in U(W)
N
, it is the case that IO(cr,u) it>. 
Suppose now that ueK(cr,w), and so IO(cr,u) 'I ii>. 
Since u ¢ R(C1,W) and R(cr,w) is dense1any neighbourhood V of u must 
intersect R(cr,W). Consequently K(cr,W) cannot have a non empty interior 
for a manifold,W, without boundary. 
Thus we obtain: 
Theorem 2 For any voting game cr, it is the case that w* (cr) � w(cr). 
Notice that w(cr) is only an upper bound on the instability dimension 
w*(cr). In some cases an upper bound lower than w(cr) can be obtained. For 
I 
8 
example, if cr is a q-game, let w(n,q) be the great�t integer which is less q ' 
n . n) than q - 2 + 1 (assuming that q > 2 . Cox (1983) effectively has shown that 
if W is a w-manifold, and w � w(n,q), then K(cr,W) has a non empty interior. 
Thus w*(cr ) must lie in the range [w(n,q)+l,q]. 
q 
For a strict maj ority rule,cr
m
' the instability dimension w*(crm
) can be 
precisely calculated. Using results of Plott (1967) and Matthews (1982) , it 
has been shown (Schofield l983e) that, for majority rule crm
, w*(crm) = 2 
if the society is of odd size and w*(crm) 
3 for a society of even size. 
With a society of odd size w(2k+l,k+l) = l and with an even size 
w(2k,k+l) = 2. 
In general if W is aw-manifold without boundary, and w � w*(cr) then 
the stable profile subspace K(cr,W) is nowhere dense. 
However if W has a boundary and w = w*(cr), then K(cr,W) may have a non 
empty interior. However for any profile u in the interior of K(cr,W) 
it must be the case that the (non empty) optima set, IO(cr,u), belongs 
to the boundary of w. 
If w > w*(cr)+l, then, even when W has a boundary, K(cr,W) must be nowhere 
dense. In this dimension range it has been shown that c;tccr,W) not only has 
a non empty interior, but is itself dense. This result is obtained by showing 
that when w > w*(cr) then IC(cr,u) is generically not only non empty, but is 
itself dense in W. 
It is possible that for a non-collegial voting game,cr, the dimension 
range [v*(cr)+l,w*(cr)-1] is non empty. In this case there may exist a 
manifold W such that both K(cr,W) and..((cr,W) have non empty interior. It 
is therefore possible to find a profile u such that "IO(cr,u) f. �" is 
structurally stable, and a second profile v such that " IC(cr,v) 'I �" is 
also structurally stable. 
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Consider for example strict majority rule crm. 
for the case (n,q) = (4,3). 
We know that v*(cr l m 1, except 
If n is even then w*(cr ) = 3, and so the two dimensional situation is an m 
intermediate case, in the sense that both cycles and optima may exist in 
a structurally stable way. If n is odd however w*(crm
) = 2, and so "structurally 
stable optima" cannot be found in the interior of w. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 sums up these observations. 
Discussion 
Rubinstein (1978) has shown, without a dimension constraint, that 
the set of profiles, which admit a core, is nowhere dense in the space 
of profiles with the Kannai topology. Cox (1983) extended this by 
effectively showing that the set K(cr,W) has empty interior in U (W)N 0 
(the space of profiles with the c0-topology)for any non-collegial voting 
game, cr . 
Suppose now that dim(W) � w*(cr)+l, for some manifold, w. 
We know from the results referred to here that K(cr,W) must have empty interior 
. ( )N . • o . . 1 l in u1 W • Since an open set in the C -topology is open in the C -topo ogy, 
this implies that K(cr,W) has empty interior in u (W)N. 0 
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But now consider the case dim(W)2_ v*(cr), and suppose u is a convex preference 
profile. By Greenberg (1978) and Strnad (1981), GO(cr,u) 'I �-
From Rubinstein's result, in any neighbourhood V of u in U (W)N there exists 0 
I 
a profile v such that GO(cr,v) = �- Of course such �profile must be 
non-convex. Although Vis also open in u1(W)
N, there will exist a 
neighbourhood V' of u in the c1-topology such that IO(cr,v') 'I � for all v'
in V' . Indeed it is plausible that for all v' in V' the core GO(cr,v') 
is non empty. This suggests in fact that we may redefine the stable subspace 
to be Ki (cr,w) N {uic:u1(W) :GO(cr,u) 'I� and IC(cr,u) �}, and obtain the 
same results as those presented here for 
subspace L1 (cr, W) is contained in /� (cr, W) 
K1(cr,w). Note also that the unstable 
N {uGU1(W) :GO(cr,u) =�and 
GC(cr,u) � �}. Consequently the results presented here for � (cr,W) are 
true for�� (cr,w). 
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Figure 1 
v*(a) v*(a)+l w*(a)-1 
1 
�- llca,w) • •1 7 
I 
<- [Inttf(a,W) 'I t] 
<:---------[Int K(a,W) rJ t] -----
w*(a) w*(a)+l 
Int K(a,w) = t 
if W without
boundary. 
I <- b('(a,W) dense] . � 
(---[Int K(a,W) • t) --� 
Classification of a voting game,a, in terms of the dimensions v*(a},w*(a} and the stable and
unstable subspaces K(a,W),,/(a,W) in the space of smooth profiles u1(w)N. 
